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Despite the fact that the main contribution of entrepreneurship theory to economics has been to 
provide an account of the performance of markets in disequilibrium, little empirical research on 
entrepreneurship has examined firm entry and exit in this context. In this paper, we attempt to 
redress this by modelling the interrelationship between firm entry and exit rates in disequilibrium. 
Using a data base of Dutch retail industries over the period 1980-2001, we are able to distinguish 
between  displacement  (entry  causing  exit)  and  replacement  (exit  causing  entry)  effects.  We 
introduce a new  methodological approach which allows us to investigate whether the relations 
under consideration differ between situations of ‘undershooting’ (the actual number of firms is 
below  the  equilibrium  number)  and  ‘overshooting’  (vice  versa).  We  find  that  the  equilibrium-
restoring mechanisms are different in these two situations – being faster in over than undershoots. 
Our estimation results also imply that for undershooting, a lack of competition between incumbent 
firms  contributes  to  restoration  of  equilibrium  (creating  room  for  new-firm  entry)  while  in 
overshooting  competition  induced  by  new  firms  (in  particular  strong  displacement)  causes  the 
number  of  firms  to  move  towards  equilibrium.  The  research  helps  to  embed  entrepreneurship 
theory into mainstream economics in a manner that adds greater insight into the performance of 
markets in disequilibrium. 
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Introduction 
The main contribution the theory of entrepreneurship has made to economics has been to provide 
an account of what happens in disequilibrium.
1 Put differently, it is about the role entrepreneurs 
play  in  the  adjustment  process  involved  in  the  movement  from  one  equilibrium  to  another.  
Remarkably, nearly all empirical analysis of entrepreneurship does so in an equilibrium context – 
usually, in the form of estimating long-run relationships/equations to identify the determinants of 
firm entry, exit and growth.
2 By doing so the raison d’être of entrepreneurship theory is ignored 
which is to explain the role played by new firms in the adjustment process towards equilibrium. 
Therefore, the issue of how firm entry and exit behave when markets are above or below their 
equilibrium number of firms remains an almost completely unexplored area of empirical research.
3 
As a result, we know very little about Schumpeter’s (1934) creative destruction process in terms of 
how new firms displace existing firms. We do not know whether this effect differs when the actual 
number of firms in a market is below the equilibrium (undershoot) from when it is above the 
                                                 
1 In classical economics entrepreneurship played little if any role simply because most of the models in this framework did not need 
entrepreneurs as they involved seamless movement from one equilibrium to another (Casson, 1982; Parker and Stead, 1991). By 
contrast  economic  theorists  interested  in  entrepreneurship  portrayed  entrepreneurs  as  activists  responsible  for  creating 
disequilibrium. Schumpeter (1934) argued that through introducing innovation (new combinations) to a market entrepreneurs 
created disequilibrium. This entailed a process of creative destruction as those firms who were unable to compete against new 
innovators went out of business.  Other theorists such as Von Mises (1949) and Kirzner (1973) argued that the key attributes (in 
this process) that make an entrepreneur innovative are ‘imagination’ and ‘alertness to new market opportunities’ respectively – 
again disequilibrating forces heralding new innovation. However, even earlier, economists more closely associated with the 
classical tradition also recognised that disequilibrium was a core attribute associated with entrepreneurship. Knight (1921) 
argued that entrepreneurs’ key attribute was an ability to deal with a state of flux where levels of uncertainty were high and 
entrepreneurs’ actions involved impure (uninsurable) risk taking. It was not until the work of Nobel Laureate Theodore Schultz 
(1975, 1980) that the synergistic elements of both schools of thought became apparent. He argued that the core attribute of 
entrepreneurs  involved  in  all  of  the  above  attributes  of  entrepreneurship  is  the  ability  to  deal  with  disequilibria.  He  saw 
entrepreneurs as both the initiators of disequilibrium and then through diffusion of innovation (and imitation) they were also the 
pioneers  of  the  new  equilibrium.  In  essence,  entrepreneurship  was  both  a  disequilibrating  and  equilibrating  force.  Casson 
(1982), took a similar view and derived a generic definition of the entrepreneur as a prime actor in a state of disequilibrium who 
took judgemental decision about the allocation of scarce resources. Both Schultz and Casson saw entrepreneurs as initially 
causing disequilibrium but also playing a major role in diffusion of innovation and hence in attaining the new equilibrium. 
 
2 An exception to this pattern has been a swathe of research focusing on the impact of the diffusion of radical and disruptive new 
technology. Papers such as Gort and Klepper (1982), Klepper and Graddy (1990), Agarwal and Gort (1996), Fein (1998), Jin, 
Perote-Pena and Troege (2004), Klepper and Simons (2005) and Baptista and Karaöz (2007) show how the equilibrium number 
of firms in a new industry changes as it grows and superior technology diffuses. This research explains how the development of 
new industries creates an initial overshoot above equilibrium in the number of firms in an industry later leading to a business 
shakeout. 
 
3 Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001) explain how new IO led to a focus on market dynamics which has been associated with a 
resurgence in interest in the economics of entrepreneurship.  This has been manifested with a significant volume of papers on 
new firm entry, exit, survival and growth (see Parker, 2004, and Shane, 2003, for an overview).  However, a notable feature of 
this research is that it has largely been undertaken without consideration of how entrepreneurs behave in disequilibrium.  Carree 
and Thurik (1996) and Burke (1996) are exceptions but we will explain later in the paper why these approaches are incomplete; 
only considering part of the disequilibrium effect and using techniques with overly restrictive (unrealistic) economic properties. 
   5 
equilibrium (overshoot).
4 By consequence, we do not know if Schumpeter’s theory of creative 
destruction interacts with more orthodox theories of competition so that its effect might be expected 
to differ between under and overshoots – the latter usually being viewed as a more competitive 
market than the former. We also know very little about replacement effects in disequilibrium. So, 
for instance, we cannot answer the question of whether a firm exiting an industry creates more 
space  for  entry  in  an  undershoot  compared to  an overshoot  or whether  it  is  the same  in both 
circumstances. We also do not know if entry and exit react differently to market situations where 
there are excessive or deficient numbers of incumbent firms compared to market situations where 
the levels of entry and exit are relatively high or low. Finally, we do not know if the adjustment to 
equilibrium is different if the market is trying to adjust from a situation where there are too few 
firms (undershoot i.e. deficient supply of firms) compared to a situation where there are too many 
(overshoot i.e. over supply of firms). Against this background, it appears that entrepreneurs and 
managers who clearly utilise much of the aforementioned economics theory still have to make 
decisions  based  to  some  extent  on  speculation  of  how  these  processes  operate  in  real  life.
5 
Likewise, the relentless policy approach across the globe where governments appear obsessed with 
encouraging  a  greater  supply  of  entrepreneurs  as  a  panacea  for  all  economic  woes  seems 
questionable without first knowing whether these are being encouraged in an over or undershoot 
environment and without knowing their actual displacement effects. Furthermore, it also turns the 
spotlight on the role of exit and replacement effects; perhaps raising the question of whether there 
is any scope to focus policy on promoting firm survival (again, aware that the need and opportunity 
for such an initiative may vary between over and undershoots). 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  start  to  rectify  this  situation.  We  offer  two  methodological 
approaches in order to achieve this objective. Firstly, we simply suggest that one does not assume 
that the adjustment process in an undershoot is identical to that in an overshoot. Therefore, by 
                                                 
4 The finance literature attributes the tendency for financial markets to overshoot to myopia and overoptimism (e.g. Barbarino and 
Jovanovic, 2007).  The same features have been highlighted as important in the entrepreneurship literature in terms of the 
importance of learning and experience (Jovanovic, 1982; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) as well as the tendency for entrepreneurs 
to be overoptimistic (De Meza and Webb, 1987; Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, 1989, and De Meza and Southey, 1996) but to 
also learn quickly once market reality kicks in (Burke, 1997, and Fraser and Greene, 2006). So it is reasonable to ask if 
established industries spend much time in disequilibrium and if so, what impact it has on firm entry and exit thereby examining 
a core area of entrepreneurship theory that has been neglected. 
 
5 The strategic management literature has also focused much attention on the need for new ventures to identify the propensity of a 
market to be subject to business shakeouts as well as which strategies they should employ in order to deal with them (for 
example, Willard and Cooper 1985, Utterback and Suarez 1993, Day 1997, and Fein, Day and Ruppersberger 2003). 
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estimating an equation for the long-run sustainable number of firms to identify periods of over and 
undershooting, we divide the sample into periods of over and undershooting and then estimate 
entry and exit equations separately in each of these regimes. This enables us to see whether the 
specification of entry and exit equations differs between these two forms of disequilibrium. This 
method tests how (if) each type of disequilibrium affects the interaction between entry and entry 
differently  but  it  still  leaves  the  remaining  issue  of  whether  the  scale  of  disequilibrium  (e.g. 
whether a 5% compared to a 50% overshoot) also has an influence. Our second methodological 
approach  tackles  this  latter  question  by  introducing  a  revised  error-correction  model  which 
accounts  for  the  impact  of  the  scale  of  disequilibrium  and  importantly  decomposes  the  error-
correction effect into unique effects attributable to the disequilibrium number of incumbent firms 
on the one hand, and the interrelation between entry and exit levels on the other hand. Therefore, 
we hope that we offer a simple methodological blue print of how one can unpack the behaviour of 
entry and exit in the various types and scales of disequilibrium. 
We apply this approach to a unique detailed data base on the Dutch retail industry which 
involves 41 shop types over a twenty-two year period (1980-2001). We develop an equilibrium 
function for the number of firms while introducing an error-correction framework. We investigate 
whether firm entry and exit relations and the equilibrium-restoring mechanisms differ in situations 
of  ‘undershooting’  (the  actual  number  of  firms  is  below  the  equilibrium  number)  and 
‘overshooting’ (the actual number of firms is above the equilibrium number). The organisation of 
the paper is as follows. We start with an outline of the basic theory underlying our methodological 
approach to account for entry and exit in disequilibrium. In the next sections we then discuss the 
equation specifications, the data and how we apply our approach to the data. We then discuss the 
results and conduct some simulations to illustrate the entry and exit adjustment process towards 
equilibrium. The final section is left for discussion and conclusions. 
Theory and Methodologies to Account for Disequilibrium 
We  assume  that  the  long-run  natural  or  sustainable  number  of  firms  t NOF in  an  industry  is  a 
function of factors  { } nt t i t x x X ,..., 1 = =  affecting the capacity of an industry to support viable firms. 
Therefore, the elements of vector t X  include items relating to firm viability such as factors relating 
to the revenues and costs of firms, demand, entry/exit barriers, industry consumer spending and   7 
liquidity.   
 
) ( t t t X NOF NOF =                                         (1) 
 
Substituting equation (1) into the identity  t t t t EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF − = − −1  (the number of firms 
is measured at the end of year t) or  ) ( 1 − − + = t t t t NOF NOF EXIT ENTRY  provides the theoretical 
basis for estimating entry and exit equations in the following specific form.  
∑ − − + + = n
i it it i t t x x EXIT ENTRY ) ( 1 1 0 α α α                             (2) 
 
∑ − − + + = n
i it it i t t x x ENTRY EXIT ) ( 1 1 0 β β β                             (3) 
 
Carree and Thurik (1996) estimate entry and exit equations which are an adjustment of this 
basic form in order to account for equilibrating effects; particularly replacement and displacement 
relationships between entry and exit. Augmenting equations (2) and (3) to account for lagged entry 
and exit gives rise to equations (4) and (5). In equation (4) the long-run replacement effect can be 
computed as the sum of the coefficients belonging to the exit variables, corrected for the impact of 
















∑ − − − − + + + + =
n
i it it i t t t t x x ENTRY EXIT EXIT ENTRY ) ( 1 1 3 1 2 1 0 α α α α α              (4) 
 
∑ − − − − + + + + =
n
i it it i t t t t x x ENTRY EXIT ENTRY EXIT ) ( 1 1 3 1 2 1 0 β β β β β              (5) 
 
This type of model has a number of properties which from an empirical perspective are quite 
restrictive  as  they  impose  questionable  features  on  the  equilibrium  process.  Firstly,  either 
displacement dominates replacement or vice versa implying that the long term adjustment process 
tends to either a zero or infinite number of firms respectively. Secondly, since replacement and 
displacement  effects  are  constant  they  cannot  vary  depending  on  whether  there  are  too  many 
(relative to a sustainable number implied from equation 1) or too few firms in the market. In other 
words, these effects are unaffected by the intensity of competition in the market.
6 Thirdly, the 
                                                 
6 In a different context the importance of distinguishing between market situations of under and overshooting is acknowledged by   8 
model  is  not  affected  by  the  extent  to  which  the  actual  number  of  firms  deviates  from  the 
sustainable number so that it makes no difference whether there are 5% too few firms, 5% too 
many or indeed 500% too many firms relative to the sustainable number. 
An alternative approach adopted by Burke (1996) involves using a formal econometric error 
correction mechanism  (ECM).  This  requires  explicit  interpretation  of  a  long-run  sustainable  or 
equilibrium number of firms  * t NOF  from equation (1) where  ) ( * t t t X NOF NOF = . The existence of 
an equilibrating process is then tested through an error-correction model represented in equation (6) 




− − − − − + − + = −
n
i
t t it it i t t NOF NOF z x x NOF NOF
1
1 1 1 0 1 * ) ( ω ω                 (6) 
 
Letting λ =1 and again making use of  t t t t EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF − = − −1  allows us to define 
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By definition  t t t t EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF − + = −1  so by substitution  1 1 * − − − t t NOF NOF  can be 
rewritten  as:  1 1 1 2 1 1 * * − − − − − − − − + = − t t t t t t NOF EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF NOF .  This  means  that 




t t t t it it i t EXIT NOF NOF z zEXIT zENTRY x x ENTRY λ ω ω + − + − + − + = ∑
=
− − − − −
1





t t t t it it i t ENTRY NOF NOF z zEXIT zENTRY x x EXIT λ ω ω + − − + − − − − = ∑
=
− − − − −
1
1 2 1 1 1 0 * ) (    (8a) 
 
Equations (7a) and (8a) illustrate the strength of the formal error correction approach in that it 
can  be  decomposed  into  effects  attributable  to  incumbent  firms  and  new  and  exiting  firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Carree, van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2007). These authors estimate an equilibrium relation for the number of business 
owners across 23 OECD countries over the period 1972-2004. They find that deviations of the actual business ownership rate 
from the equilibrium rate have a negative effect on subsequent economic growth in case the number of business owners is 
below its equilibrium (i.e. undershooting) but deviations do not have a significant effect in case of overshooting. In other words, 
there appears to be a ‘growth penalty’ for having too few business owners but not so for having too many. 
   9 
Therefore, estimation of equations (7a) and (8a) is more comprehensive than Carree and Thurik’s 
(1996) specification as it  accounts for displacement and replacement effects but unlike their model 
it also accounts for a disequilibrium in the number of incumbent firms. The new unearthed ECM 
term  ] * [ 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF z   in  equations  (7a)  and  (8a)  is  intuitive  as  it gives  a  measure  to  the 
deviation from the actual number at the start of the previous year from the sustainable number over 
the year. Thus, it provides a good gauge of whether competition and hence profit opportunities are 
currently above or below a sustainable level – the exact sort of information one would expect to 
influence entry and exit decisions. 
However, the weakness of the ECM approach is that the specification of equations (7a) and 
(8a) imply that a  fixed parameter z  applies to  entry,  exit and disequilibrium in the number of 
incumbent firms.
7 Unless one imagines an extreme and unrealistic scenario where firms are entirely 
homogeneous, there is little in economic theory to justify such a restriction.   
Therefore, a more theoretically and empirically robust approach is to estimate equations (7a) 
and  (8a)  directly  where  the  parameter  values  on  (current  and  lagged)  ENTRY  and  EXIT  and 
deviations of the actual number of incumbents from the equilibrium number are freely estimated 
rather than constrained to be uniform.  This gives rise to the following entry and exit disequilibrium 
adjustment equations.
8 The main novel contribution of this approach is that it identifies the unique 




t t it it i t EXIT EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF x x ENTRY µ γ ϕ ψ α α + + + − + − + = − −
=
− − − ∑ 1 1
1





t t it it i t ENTRY EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF x x EXIT φ τ ρ θ β β + + + − + − + = − −
=
− − − ∑ 1 1
1
1 2 1 0 ) * ( ) (     (10) 
 
This then leaves us with the remaining problem we noted earlier in that such an estimation 
implies that the coefficients on the replacement and displacement effects are uniform in both under 
and overshoots. However, we postulate that the adjustment process may not be symmetric when 
                                                 
7 As derived above equations (7a) and (8a) also imply that displacement and replacement effects are identical; if λ = 1 then both the 
replacement and the displacement effect equal  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( = − − = − − z z z z λ . This is not realistic. 
 
8 Bosma, de Wit and Carree (2005) also specify entry and exit equations which include the disequilibrium number of incumbent 
firms. However, they do not include entry and exit variables on the right-hand-side of the equation so that they cannot measure 
replacement and displacement effects. Moreover, due to data restrictions they are forced to estimate their model using 13 
observations only.  
   10 
comparing market overshoots  t t NOF NOF * > and undershoots  t t NOF NOF * < .  Competition is 
excessive in an overshoot to the point that the number of firms must decline.  In such circumstances 
one would expect a considerable body of vulnerable weak firms – weak in terms of their ability to 
compete  in  terms  of  price  (cost)  and  product  characteristics  or  sustain  in  terms  of  liquidity.  
Correspondingly in an undershoot more profit opportunities exist and incumbent firms are able to 
earn temporary monopolistic profits where even weak firms find it easier to be sustainable (Tirole, 
1988). Furthermore, if network effects play a role (as one would expect in retailing) then if the 
actual number of firms is below the equilibrium, additional entry, far from threatening the viability 
of existing firms, may in fact enhance viability. In essence, more retail outlets raise the appeal of 
the  retail  region  thereby  drawing  in  more  customers.  One  would  expect  these  effects  to  be 
overpowered by competition effects for entry occurring when the number of firms is above the 
equilibrium level. In these circumstances, it is possible that the adjustment process may not be 
symmetric.  So  one  might  reasonably  expect  the  displacement  effect  (entry  causing  exit)  to  be 
weaker  in  an  undershoot  compared  to  an  overshoot.  Correspondingly,  one  would  expect  the 
replacement effect (exit causing entry) to be stronger in an undershoot where there are more market 
opportunities. 
Therefore,  we  propose  an  approach  which  involves  splitting  the  data  set  into  over  and 
undershoots and then estimate the new entry and exit equations as follows (where superscripts u 
and o indicate undershoot and overshoot sample equations respectively). For brevity we only report 
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We can now write the replacement (R) and displacement (D) effects for under (u) and overshoots 
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This approach gives a key insight into the cyclical means through which entry and exit can 
propagate or prevent economies from achieving equilibrium. By consequence, it gives a more rich   11 
insight into the challenges for enterprise policy; particularly promoting enterprise when there are 
not enough firms compared to managing excess supply of enterprise when there are too many.  It 
also highlights a cyclical dimension in terms of the extent to which new firms displace existing 
firms as well as the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium.  This approach, based on the bedrock 
of economic theory, raises the question of whether enterprise policy should in fact have counter 
cyclical elements i.e. should it vary in its intensity of encouraging business start-ups across over 
and undershoots and should it be more focused on survival (combating exit)?  
Empirical Model 
Carree and Thurik (1996) used an earlier version of the dataset to investigate replacement and 
displacement  effects  and  we  adopt  many  of  their  independent  variables.  Using  the  theoretical 
framework outlined in the previous section, our model enables us to investigate whether error-
correction actually takes place, the extent to which error-correction runs through entry or through 
exit,  whether  the  speed  of  adjustment  is  high  or  low,  and  whether  the  magnitudes  of  the 
displacement and replacement effects are different in situations of undershooting and overshooting. 
Basically the model consists of an equation describing the long-run sustainable number of firms 
(equation 1 below), as well as an entry and an exit equation structured in line with equations (9) 
and (10) in the previous section.  
The long-run sustainable number of firms in an industry depends on elements of the revenues 
and costs of the  entrepreneur, demand, and  entry  and  exit barriers. Estimation of the long-run 
number  of  firms  allows  us  to  empirically  distinguish  between  situations  of  undershooting  and 
overshooting, and also to establish the extent of disequilibrium (i.e. the difference between the 
actual and the long-run sustainable number of firms). The entry and exit equations include entry 
and  exit  terms  on  the  right-hand-side  as  well,  describing  the  interrelations  between  the  two 
variables (i.e. replacement and displacement effects). The extent of disequilibrium derived from 
equation  (1)  is  also  included  in  the  entry  and  exit  equations,  along  with  a  number  of  control 
variables describing the attractiveness of the industry, demand conditions, entry and exit barriers 
and macro-economic (business cycle) conditions. A more  elaborate description of the rationale 
behind our model will be provided at the end of this section. 
Our model reads as follows.   12 
it t t it it t it i it HP IR TUR CS MI NOF ν γ γ γ γ γ π γ γ + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1                   (1) 
 
( ) it it it it it it
it it it t t it it i it
NOF NOF ENTRY EXIT EXIT
FS SSP DF DUN UN DCS PMI ENTRY
ε α α α α
α α α α α α α α
+ − + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
− − − −
− − − − − − −
*
1 2 11 1 10 1 9 8
1 7 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0   (9) 
 
( ) it it it it it it
it it it t t it it i it
NOF NOF ENTRY EXIT ENTRY
FS SSP DF DUN UN DCS PMI EXIT
η β β β β
β β β β β β β β
+ − + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
− − − −
− −
*
1 2 11 1 10 1 9 8
7 6 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 0         (10) 
 
Where: 
NOF   logarithm of the number of firms (end of year) 
* NOF   logarithm of the equilibrium number of firms 
π   logarithm of the average profit per store (in 1990 prices) 
MI   logarithm of the average modal income (in 1990 prices) 
CS    logarithm of the total consumer spending (in 1990 prices) 
TUR   logarithm of turbulence (sum of entry and exit) 
IR  ten years interest rate 
HP  index of average house price 
ENTRY   entry rate: number of entries divided by number of firms at start of year 
EXIT   exit rate: number of exits divided by number of firms at start of year 
PMI   average profit divided by modal income 
DCS   (relative) change in real consumer spending  
UN   number of unemployed (in millions) 
DUN   (absolute) change of number of unemployed (in millions) 
DF   degree of franchising: number of franchisees as a fraction of the total number of firms 
SSP   small store presence: share of small firms (less than ten employees) in total industry 
  turnover 
FS   floorspace requirement (in 10,000 square meters) 
ν   disturbance term of equation (1) 
η ε,   disturbance terms of equations (9) and (10), possibly correlated 
i, t  indices for shop type (industry) and year, respectively 
 
A novelty of our model is that it includes a function for the long-run sustainable number of 
firms  in  an  error-correction  framework.  The  aim  is  to  investigate  whether  or  not  there  is  an 
autonomous effect on entry and exit if the number of firms in an industry is in disequilibrium. In 
other words, if the number of firms is lower than may be  expected on the basis of some  key 
determinants  of  the  long-run  number  of  firms,  this  may  indicate  incentives  to  entry  (e.g. 
competition may be relatively low which may make it easier for an entrant to make profits) and 
disincentives to exit (low competition makes it easier to survive). Analogously, a situation where   13 
the number of firms is relatively high may make it less attractive to enter and may cause exit levels 
to be higher (as competition between incumbents may be higher). Hence, parameters  11 α  and  11 β  are 
expected to be negative and positive, respectively. 
The equilibrium function (1) is defined in log-levels (as we explain the absolute number of 
firms, not a ratio) and we include the self-employment income (i.e. net profit), the opportunity costs 
of self-employment (i.e. modal income), the demand for products and services sold in the shop type 
and the level of turbulence, which is a measure of entry and exit barriers.
9 In addition, we include 
the interest rate and the average house price which are indicators for the cost of capital and cost of 
property, respectively. See equation (1). 
The effect of profits (parameter  2 γ ) is indeterminate from theory. Higher profits will attract 
more firms but once more firms enter the market (in particular imitative entries), average profits 
will drop. Hence, in the long run the relation could be either positive or negative (Burke, van Stel 
and Thurik, 2008). A higher modal income reflects higher opportunity costs of entrepreneurship 
hence  3 γ  is expected to be negative. Higher demand creates room for more firms ( 4 γ  positive), and 
higher turbulence indicates lower barriers which is associated with room for more firms in the 
market ( 5 γ  positive).
10 If the costs of attracting loans or the costs of renting floor space increase 
over time, less people may be inclined to start businesses:  6 γ  and  7 γ  are expected to be negative. In 
addition, we include industry-specific constants  i 1 γ  (i.e. fixed effects).  These dummy  variables 
capture  structural  differences  between  industries  such  as  the  minimum  efficient  scale,  capital 
requirements, market size, and so on. 
Equations (9) and (10) contain several determinants of entry and exit used by Carree and 
Thurik (1996). As profits are a good reflection of the income of entrepreneurs in the retail industry 
(the vast majority runs unincorporated businesses) we use the profits to modal income ratio (PMI) 
to measure the relative attractiveness to enter a shop type. Demand growth is measured by the 
                                                 
9 Our model contains three more indicators of entry and exit barriers: DF, SSP and FS. However, we do not include DF or SSP here 
as an indicator of barriers because these are ratio variables. Since we are explaining the (log of) the absolute number of firms we 
want to include a variable which is also defined in numbers. Although FS is defined in numbers (of squared kilometres), this is a 
very  specific  variable,  and  we  want  to  include  a  more  general  indicator  of  the  level  of  barriers.  We  choose  the  level  of 
turbulence (sum of entry and exit) for this. 
 
10 As both the number of firms and the turbulence level are included in levels, parameter  5 γ  may to some extent also capture market 
size differences between the industries. 
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growth rate of consumer expenditures on the goods and services sold in the shop type (DCS). 
While  the  variables  PMI  and  DCS  are  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  entry,  they  are 
expected to have a negative impact on exit at the same time. Unemployment (UN) and change in 
unemployment (DUN) may have a positive effect on entry as the (newly) unemployed may have 
limited  alternative  employment  options  in  the  wage  sector.  High  unemployment  is  also  a 
disincentive to exit as economic circumstances are not favourable to find a different occupation. 
Following Carree and Thurik (1996), three indicators of entry and exit barriers are included. The 
degree of franchising (DF) may have a negative impact on entry and a positive impact on exit 
because franchisees enjoy certain benefits associated with the membership of a franchise chain. 
This may make it more difficult for independent new firms to enter or, when entered, to survive. 
Small store presence (SSP) is a general indicator of (low) entry and exit barriers. In industries with 
a high output share of small firms, economies of scale are apparently not so important, and entry 
and exit may occur more often. Hence the expected sign is positive on both entry and exit. The 
variable ‘floorspace requirements’ (FS) is an indicator of required investments. When a large shop 
is needed to run a business, more capital is required which may be difficult to obtain. Also, once 
entered, often large investments are made which makes the entrepreneur less flexible to exit the 
shop type. Hence the expected effect is negative, both for entry and exit. In addition, industry fixed 
effects  are  included  to  capture  structural  differences  in  market  dynamics  between  different 
industries. Note that all variables are entered with a lag except for the unemployment and barrier 
variables for the exit equations, which are assumed to have an immediate impact. 
Replacement and displacement effects are measured in line with the definitions in equation 
(11). In the entry equation (9) the replacement effect is captured by the exit and lagged exit terms. 
As entry rates tend to be highly autocorrelated over time, we also include a lagged dependent 
variable. In the long run, the replacement effect can be computed as the sum of the coefficients 
belonging to the exit variables, corrected for the impact of the lagged entry rate on the right hand 






+ . Analogously, from equation (10) 






+ . As explained in the previous section these can 
be estimated separately for under and overshoot sample splits.    15 
The Data 
We use a data base for 41 shop types within the retail sector over the period 1980-2001. Our data 
base combines variables from two major sources: the Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK) and 
a  panel  of  independent  Dutch  retailers  (establishments)  called  ‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’ 
(interfirm  comparison  system)  which  was  operated  by  EIM  Business  and  Policy  Research  in 
Zoetermeer. The data are complemented and enriched using information from several sources. As 
the number of shop types investigated in the ‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’ has varied in the 1980s 
and 1990s, our data base is an unbalanced panel. By and large, we have 28 shop types with data for 
the 1980s and 1990s and 13 shop types with data for the 1990s only. The exact data period per shop 
type for which entry and exit rates are available is given in Table 1.
11 The table also contains shop 
type averages for the entry and exit rates. Details on the measurement and source for each variable 
are given below. We applied several corrections to the raw data in order to make the data ready for 
analysis. 
Raw data on the number of firms ( NOF ) and the numbers of entries and exits are obtained 
from the Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK). CRK provides data on the number of new 
registrations  and  deregistrations  of  establishments  for  each  shop  type.  The  number  of  new 
registrations (deregistrations) divided by the number of firms (at start of year) equals the entry 
(exit) rate (variables  ENTRY  and  EXIT ), while the (logarithm of the) sum of new registrations 
and deregistrations equals  TUR. Over time the sectoral classification of shop types used by CRK 
changed several times and we corrected for trend breaks that were introduced by these changes.  
Raw data on average (net) profit per store are taken from the ‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’ 
(BSS). This panel was started by EIM in the 1970s and each year a large number of firms were 
asked for their financial performance. Although the panel changes from year to year (each year 
some firms exit the panel while some others enter), it is important to note that we compute the 
relative change in average profit based on only those firms present in the panel in year t and t-1. 
Hence,  the  dynamics  of this variable  are  not  influenced  by  changes in  the  composition of  the 
panel.
12 Until the beginning of the 1990s  average profit levels were computed based on about 
                                                 
11 Due to missing values for other variables in the model (in particular degree of franchising and small store presence), the sample 
represented in Table 1 is not exactly the same as the sample used for the regression analysis. 
 
12 Hence we choose a base year to compute the level of average profits, and next we compute the levels for the other years making 
use of the relative changes of only those firms present in two consecutive years. As most firms stayed in the panel for many   16 
seventy individual retail stores per shop type but from the beginning of the 1990s the coverage of 
the panel decreases, i.e. less firms participate so that shop type averages become less reliable. 
Fortunately, the timing of this decrease coincides with the start of average financial performance 
registration by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) at low sectoral aggregation levels. Hence from the 
early 1990s onwards we have information on the development over time of these variables from 
two sources: BSS and CBS. It turned out that differences between these two sources were small 
which increases confidence in our constructed times series. From 1994 onwards we use the average 
of the annual relative change implied by these two sources.
13 In our model the average profit level 
per store is used both in levels (variable π ) and relative to modal income (i.e. it is also used as the 
nominator of the  PMI  variable). Variable  FS  (floorspace requirements) is also taken from the 
‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’. A similar correction for changes in the composition of the panel has 
been applied to this variable. 
Data on total consumer spendings on the products and services sold in a certain shop type CS  
is taken from Statistics Netherlands (publication ‘Budgetonderzoeken’ or Budget statistics).
14 The 
variables modal income  MI , small store presence  SSP , and unemployment  UN  are also taken 
from Statistics Netherlands. Modal income is also used as denominator of the  PMI  variable. Data 
on the degree of franchising  DF  have been obtained from the Netherlands Central Board for the 
Retail Trade (HBD), while the ten years interest rate  IR and the home price index  HP are taken 
from ORTEC, a distinguished financial research firm based in the Netherlands. Finally, for the 
variables profits, modal income and consumer spendings we used a consumer price index to correct 
for inflation.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
years, these relative changes are also based on a substantial number of firms, but this way we correct for trend breaks introduced 
by a changing composition of the panel (e.g. when a firm with exceptionally high profits would enter or exit the panel). For the 
base year we always choose a year for which the number of participating firms in the panel is high. 
 
13  Ideally,  one  would  like  to  use  information  from  Statistics  Netherlands  (CBS)  as  this  is  the  national  statistical  office  in  the 
Netherlands. However, as the number of firms in a shop type (which is approximately fourth digit level) is often small, and the 
number of firms is rounded to thousands in CBS statistics, using the CBS data also implies some extent of measurement error. 
Therefore we use information from both sources to estimate the dynamic pattern of the profit variable. 
 
14 Total consumer spending was computed by multiplying the variables average household spending, the total number of households 
in the Netherlands and the share of a certain shop type in total household spendings.   17 
 
Table 1: Entry and exit rates for shop types  
Shop type  Period  Average entry rate  Average exit rate 
 
N 
Grocers/supermarkets  1980-2001  0.086  0.107  22 
Greengrocers  1980-2001  0.083  0.110  22 
Liquor stores  1980-2001  0.082  0.103  22 
Shoe stores  1980-2001  0.077  0.086  22 
Furnishing + furniture (mixed)  1980-2001  0.070  0.088  22 
Bicycle stores  1980-2001  0.047  0.060  22 
Jewelleries  1980-2001  0.088  0.084  22 
Drug stores  1980-2001  0.086  0.082  22 
Florists  1980-2001  0.115  0.116  22 
Butchers  1980-2001  0.078  0.106  22 
Fish shops  1980-2001  0.111  0.111  22 
Bakers  1980-2001  0.076  0.093  22 
Confectioners  1980-2001  0.104  0.116  22 
Tobacco shops  1980-2001  0.050  0.086  22 
Households goods shops  1980-2001  0.090  0.097  22 
Paint, glass, wall-paper   1980-2001  0.058  0.085  22 
Hardware stores  1980-2001  0.066  0.084  22 
Photographer's shops  1980-2001  0.082  0.084  22 
Pet shops  1980-2001  0.104  0.101  22 
Textiles mens wear  1989-2001  0.045  0.097  13 
Furniture    1980-2001  0.129  0.115  22 
Dairy shops  1980-2001  0.045  0.096  22 
Electrics  1980-2001  0.071  0.090  22 
Audiovisual devices  1980-2001  0.141  0.135  22 
Sewing-machines  1980-2001  0.065  0.095  22 
Glass, porceline and pottery  1980-2001  0.129  0.121  22 
Office and school materials  1980-2001  0.099  0.099  22 
Opticians  1980-2001  0.098  0.072  22 
Toys  1980-2001  0.155  0.119  22 
Poultry  1989-2001  0.069  0.105  13 
Clothing materials  1989-2001  0.056  0.111  13 
Musical instruments  1989-2001  0.093  0.085  13 
Do-it-yourself shop  1989-2001  0.129  0.105  13 
Videotheques  1989-2001  0.328  0.309  13 
Gardening centres  1989-2001  0.160  0.095  13 
Reform  1989-2001  0.215  0.144  13 
Baby’s clothing  1989-2001  0.156  0.163  13 
Children’s clothing  1989-2001  0.272  0.193  13 
Textiles underwear  1989-2001  0.203  0.138  13 
Leather goods  1989-2001  0.112  0.115  13 
Sport and camping equipment  1990-2001  0.151  0.113  12 
Note: The second column contains the period for which the entry and exit rates are available. The third and fourth 
column contain the entry and exit rates, averaged over the period indicated in the second column. The final column 
contains the number of observations on which the shop type averages are based. 
Source: Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK) and EIM Business and Policy Research.   18 
 
Estimation Strategy 
As described in the Theory section, there are two approaches with respect to modelling adjustment 
in  disequilibrium  in  entrepreneurship  (see  also  Bosma,  de  Wit  and  Carree,  2005).  The  first 
approach uses a formal econometric error correction model (ECM), while the second approach 
models the interrelation between entry and exit. An advantage of the first approach is that the 
behaviour  of  the  model  is  realistic  in  the  sense  that  there  is  equilibrium-seeking  behaviour. 
However, as was shown in equations (7a) and (8a), the properties of  the ECM imply that the 
coefficients of the disequilibrium number of incumbents and those of the entry and exit levels (i.e. 
replacement  and  displacement)  are  identical,  thereby  imposing  unrealistic  constraints  on  the 
estimation.  
The second approach is capable of accommodating different replacement and displacement 
effects but this approach does not feature equilibrium restoring behaviour. Either the replacement 
effect dominates or the displacement effect. When the replacement effect dominates, on average in 
the long run the number of new firms replacing a given number of exits (say N exits), is higher than 
the number of exiting firms being displaced by the same number of entries N. In other words, if in 
the long run the exogenous shocks to entry and exit are in the same order of magnitude, the number 
of firms will increase to infinity as the number of new firms replacing exiting firms is higher than 
the number of exiting firms being displaced by new-firm entries. Vice versa, when displacement 
dominates, the process will –ceteris paribus– converge to zero firms.  
These characteristics are not realistic. An equilibrium-restoring process is consistent with a 
dominant replacement effect in case the number of firms is below its long-run sustainable value 
(undershooting) and a dominant displacement effect in case the number of firms is above its long-
run value (overshooting). Therefore our first aim is to investigate whether we actually find these 
error-correction  characteristics  if  we  estimate  the  entry/exit  model  separately  for  under  and 
overshooting. For this test, we refrain from the second equilibrium restoring process, i.e. we do not 
include the variable measuring the extent of disequilibrium  ) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF , so that we obtain 
a ‘pure’ comparison of the replacement and displacement effects. In other words, we estimate the 
model formed by equations (1)-(9)-(10) but without estimating parameters  11 α  and  11 β .    19 
In order to be able to make a distinction between situations of under and over-shooting, we 
will start by estimating the long-run sustainable number of firms (equation 1). Observations for 
which  t t NOF NOF * ) (> < are  characterized  by  undershooting  (overshooting).  Next,  as  just 
described,  we  estimate  the  model  separately  for  under-  and  overshooting  while  excluding  the 
) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF   variable.  This  will  give  us  some  first  insights  about  (a)  the  equilibrium-
seeking behaviour of the entry/exit model in under- and overshooting, and (b) the ability of the 
estimated long-run function to empirically distinguish between under- and overshooting situations. 
If the error-correction requirements of the model are met by the estimation results, this would 
provide some confidence that the entry/exit model is not mis-specified, and, in addition, that the 
estimation of the long-run number of firms is also not implausible.  
The  final  step  of  our  regression  exercises  will  be  to  estimate  the  full  model  (including 
parameters  11 α   and  11 β ),  again  separately  for  under  and  overshooting.  This  will  allow  us  to 
investigate whether the extent of disequilibrium adds to the explanation of entry and exit levels, 
next to the replacement and displacement effects. It will also shed light on the question which 
mechanism is more important for restoration of equilibrium: the interrelation between entry and 
exit (replacement and displacement effects) or the autonomous effect of the number of firms being 
out-of-equilibrium (variable  ) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF ).  We  can also see  whether these mechanisms 
work out differently for under and overshooting situations.  We then conclude the analysis with a 
series of simulations illustrating how the adjustment process operates in disequilibrium for both 
over and undershoots. 
Results and Simulations 
As the error terms of equations (9) and (10) are correlated, we estimate the entry and exit equations 
using three stage least squares (3SLS). In addition, equation (1) is estimated using OLS and the 
fitted (i.e. predicted) values of this estimation serve as  t NOF * . This allows us to compute variable 
) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF  which is then subsequently inserted into equations (9) and (10). Furthermore, 
as the variance of the error terms systematically differs between shop types we make a correction 
by  estimating  the  variance  of  the  error  terms  for  each  shop  type  and  adjusting  the  models 
accordingly. These estimates are obtained by regressing the squared residuals of the uncorrected 
models on a set of shop type dummy variables. The coefficients obtained in this way  give an   20 
estimate of the variance in a particular shop type. Our models are then adjusted by dividing each 
explanatory and dependent variable by the appropriate square root of the estimated variance. This is 
in effect similar to a weighted least squares estimation and solves the problem of heteroscedasticity 
caused by the different shop types (Stewart, 1991). 
After removing seven outliers, we have an unbalanced panel of 568 observations distributed 
over 41 shop types.
15 Estimation results for the long-run sustainable number of firms are presented 
in Table 2 while the results for the entry and exit equations, excluding the  ) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF   
variable,  are  in  Table  3.  As  mentioned,  these  results  are  presented  separately  for  under  and 
overshooting. New-firm entry in situations of ‘undershooting’ (relatively few firms in the market) 
may not only put pressure on incumbents to exit, but there may also be a countereffect in the sense 
that new entries into a (geographical) market may attract more customers to an area of retail shops, 
from which the incumbent firms benefit as well (i.e. there is a positive network effect). Hence the 
displacement  effect  may  be  weaker  in  case  of  undershooting  compared  to  overshooting.  We 
investigate these differences by splitting the original sample of 568 observations into a subsample 
for which the actual number of firms is lower than the estimated equilibrium number of firms 
(undershooting) and a subsample for which the actual number of firms is higher than the estimated 
equilibrium number of firms (overshooting).  
                                                 
15 The number of observations used in the regressions is lower than suggested by the total number of observations in Table 1. This is 
due to several missing values for certain model variables, in particular for the degree of franchising and small store presence. 
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Table 2: Estimation results long term relation log of number of firms (N=568) 
  Long term relation, dependent variable NOF 
 
π   -0.007 
(0.2) 
MI   -1.46 *** 
(4.9) 
CS   0.183 *** 
(3.2) 
TUR   0.491 *** 
(19.1) 
IR   0.549 
(0.6) 
HP   -0.001 * 
(1.9) 
Note: The long term relation is estimated from an OLS regression. Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are 
between brackets. Dependent variable is the log of the number of firms. Industry fixed effects are included but not 
reported.  
* significant at 0.10 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level   22 
 
Table 3: Estimation results, under- and overshooting, excluding error-correction mechanism for incumbent firms 
  Undershooting (N=305)  Overshooting (N=263) 
 
  ENTRY 
 
EXIT  ENTRY  EXIT 
























































EXIT  1.178 *** 
(14.8) 
  0.848 *** 
(17.8) 
 
ENTRY    0.804 *** 
(20.5) 
  1.189 *** 
(20.5) 
















         
Replacement effect  1.07    0.82   
Displacement effect    0.87    1.24 
Note: Results are from 3SLS regressions. Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are between brackets. Both 
the entry and exit equations include industry fixed effects dummies (not reported). NOF* is the predicted value of (the 
log of) the number of firms, computed from the estimated long term relation reported in Table 2. The undershooting 
sample includes those observations for which NOF t-1 < NOF* t-1. The overshooting sample includes those observations 
for which NOF  t-1 > NOF*  t-1. The variables UN, DUN, DF, SSP and FS are one period lagged only for the entry 
equation. The replacement (displacement) effect is computed by summing the coefficients for current and lagged exit 
(entry), and dividing this sum by one minus the coefficient for lagged entry (exit). Coefficients for lagged endogenous 
variables are in italics. 
* significant at 0.10 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
 
Regarding the long-run function for the number of firms (Table 2), the coefficients for modal 
income (negative), consumer spending (positive) and turbulence (positive) are highly significant 
and in the hypothesised direction. The effect of profits is not significant, perhaps indicating that the 
positive  effect  of  higher  profits  attracting  more  firms  is  neutralised  by  the  negative  effect  of   23 
imitative entry lowering the average profit level in the industry (Burke, van Stel and Thurik, 2008). 
We find a negative effect of the house price index, which we use as a rough indicator for the cost of 
renting floor space. We do not find an effect of the interest rate. 
From the entry and exit equations in Table 3, we see that there is a positive effect of profits 
(PMI) on entry and a negative impact on exit. Higher financial returns to running a business are an 
incentive to enter and a disincentive to exit. The result is stronger for undershooting, possibly 
indicating that higher profits are even more attractive when there are relatively few competitors in 
the  market.  Changes  in  consumer  spending  have  no  impact  on  entry  and  exit  rates,  perhaps 
indicating that fluctuations in demand are captured by expansion and contraction of incumbent 
firms. Concerning unemployment (variables UN and DUN), by and large we find positive effects 
for entry and negative effects for exit, as hypothesised. An exception is the pattern for entry in case 
of undershooting: we find a negative effect on entry of the level of unemployment but a positive 
effect of the change in unemployment. This may indicate that primarily the newly unemployed are 
inclined to set up shop while those who are already unemployed for a longer spell are discouraged 
to employ new initiatives. Because in situations of undershooting there is more room in the market 
for new-firm entry, the stronger coefficient of DUN (compared to overshooting) is not surprising. 
Of the barrier variables DF, SSP and FS, we only find a significant positive effect of small store 
presence in the case of undershooting. Lower entry and exit barriers lead to more entry.  
Concerning interrelations between entry and exit, we see that replacement is stronger than 
displacement for undershooting, while displacement is the dominant  market process in case of 
overshooting. These results are consistent with a mechanism of error-correction: for undershooting 
replacement dominates, ceteris paribus leading to an increase of the number of firms, while for 
overshooting the stronger displacement effect leads to a decrease of the number of firms. In both 
cases the number of firms thus moves in the direction of the long-run sustainable number of firms. 
As equilibrium-seeking behaviour is a standard characteristic of an economic model, these results 
provide  confidence  in  the  specification  of  our  model,  formed  by  equations  (1)-(9)-(10).  The 
magnitude of the replacement and displacement effects in case of overshooting are 0.82 and 1.24, 
respectively. This means that, ceteris paribus in the long run, on every 100 exiting firms 82 new 
firms enter the market place. On the other hand, on average, every 100 new-firm entries cause 124 
(presumably  inefficient)  firms  to  exit.  We  also note  that the  (absolute)  difference  between  the 
replacement  effect  and  the  displacement  effect  is  lower  for  undershooting  (0.20)  compared  to   24 
overshooting (0.42). This implies that the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is slower for 
undershooting  than  for  overshooting.  Finally,  the  higher  sum of  replacement  and  displacement 
effects in case of overshooting (2.06 versus 1.94) suggests that in this mode economic dynamism, 
in terms of the interrelation between entry and exit, is somewhat higher. 
From the lags in the model specification it is clear that the effect of entry on exit and the vice 
versa  effect  do  not  take  place  immediately,  but  instead  take  a  number  of  periods  (years)  to 
capitalise. In Table 4 we illustrate the time lags involved in the replacement effect implied by the 
parameter  estimates of  the (lagged) entry  and  exit variables  in case  of  undershooting  (see  left 
column of Table 3). As we can see the immediate impact is by far the biggest (1.178), and already 
after  two  periods  the  long-term  replacement  effect  of  1.07  has  almost  been  reached.  Hence, 
although there are lags involved in the entry and exit interrelation process, the replacement and 
displacement effects capitalise quite fast.
16 
 
Table 4: Illustration replacement effect, case of undershooting 
Time period 
 
Effect on entry  Cumulative effect on entry 
0  1.178*1 = 1.178  1.178 
1  -0.296*1 + 0.176*1.178 = -0.089  1.089 
2  0.176*-0.089 = -0.016  1.074 
3  0.176*-0.016 = -0.003  1.071 
4  0.176*-0.003 = -0.0005  1.070 
5  0.176*-0.0005 = -0.0001  1.070 
 
Replacement effect (converging effect over time): 
 
1.070 
Note: The table shows the entry effects over time of a unit shock to exit at time 0. 
 
 
Results including the NOFt-2-NOF*t-1 variable 
We now move on to the results when the variable NOFt-2-NOF*t-1 is included in the model. See 
Table 5. Results for profits, change in consumer spending, (change in) unemployment, and the 
degree of franchising hardly change when compared to Table 3. Results for small store presence 
and floorspace requirements change somewhat. In particular, for small store presence there is now a 
negative  effect  on  exit  for  undershooting  and  a  positive  effect  on  exit  for  overshooting.  The 
                                                 
16 Intuitively, this is also clear from the fact that the coefficients of the contemporaneous entry and exit variables are much bigger 
than those of the lagged variables. 
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negative effect is counterintuitive. Both effects are significant at 10% level only. We also find a 
positive effect of floorspace requirements on exit in case of undershooting. Again, the effect is only 
significant at 10% level. 
Our focus is, of course, on the equilibrium-seeking characteristics of the model. Results in 
Table 5 reveal that error-correction takes place through different mechanisms. For undershooting, 
we see that the replacement and displacement effects are almost equal. These effects approximately 
cancel  each  other  out,  thereby  contributing  only  marginally  to  error-correction.  Instead,  the 
autonomous  effect  of  the  variable  NOFt-2-NOF*t-1  plays  a  more  important  role  in  restoring 
equilibrium. The extent of disequilibrium contributes positively to entry and negatively to exit. The 
coefficients for undershooting imply that, when at a certain point in time the number of firms is 
below equilibrium by a certain magnitude, then in the subsequent year 4.8% of the gap is reduced 
autonomously by means of a higher number of entries
17 and 3.9% by means of a lower number of 
exits.  When  there  are  relatively  few  firms  in  the  market,  several  economic  agents  smell 
opportunities to make a profit and start new businesses. Also, less firms exit.  
For overshooting these effects are 2.7% (less entries)
18 and 3.7% (more exits) of a certain gap 
between the actual and the equilibrium number of firms. Apparently, individuals are aware when 
markets are saturated, and in case the number of firms is above equilibrium, entry levels are lower 
and exit levels are higher. However, from Table 5 we see that for overshooting, displacement is 
much stronger than replacement, implying a strong tendency for the number of firms to decline 
(new entries cause relatively many exits while exiting firms are replaced by new firms only to a 
limited extent). This interplay between entry and exit is in fact by far the dominant equilibrium-
restoring mechanism in case of overshooting, as we will illustrate in the next subsection. 
                                                 
17 Note that the variable (NOF – NOF*) is negative in case of undershooting, hence the negative coefficient implies more entries. 
 
18 Note that the variable (NOF – NOF*) is positive in case of overshooting, hence the negative coefficient now implies less entries. 
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Table 5: Estimation results, under- and overshooting, including error-correction mechanism for incumbent firms 
  Undershooting (N=305)  Overshooting (N=263) 
 
  ENTRY 
 
EXIT  ENTRY  EXIT 
























































EXIT  1.06 *** 
(12.0) 
  0.680 *** 
(12.2) 
 
ENTRY    0.855 *** 
(17.3) 
  1.445 *** 
(15.9) 
















         








         
Replacement effect  0.95    0.67   
Displacement effect    0.93    1.48 
Note: Results are from 3SLS regressions. Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are between brackets. Both 
the  entry  and  exit  equations  include  industry  fixed  effects  dummies  (not  reported).  NOF*  is  computed  from  the 
estimated long term relation reported in Table 2. The undershooting sample includes those observations for which NOF 
t-1 < NOF* t-1. The overshooting sample includes those observations for which NOF t-1 > NOF* t-1. The variables UN, 
DUN, DF, SSP and FS are one period lagged only for the entry equation. The replacement (displacement) effect is 
computed by summing the coefficients for current and lagged exit (entry), and dividing this sum by one minus the 
coefficient for lagged entry (exit). Coefficients for lagged endogenous variables are in italics. 
* significant at 0.10 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
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Restoration of Equilibrium in Undershooting and Overshooting  
We now focus in more detail on the relative importance of both equilibrium-restoring mechanisms 
(i.e.  replacement  and  displacement  versus  the  effect  of  the  variable  NOFt-2-NOF*t-1)  using 
simulations  –based  on  the  estimated  coefficients  of  Table  5–  for  under  and  overshooting.  In 
particular, we assume a starting situation where the equilibrium number of firms in a market equals 
100, and the absolute number of entries and exits both equal 10. In the first simulation, we assume 
that the actual number of firms initially equals 90 (undershooting) while in the second simulation 
we  assume  that  the  actual  number  of  firms  initially  equals  110  (overshooting).
19  For  ease  of 
exposition we also assume that the equilibrium number of firms does not change over time. In 
Tables  6  and  7  we  show  what  happens  to  entry,  exit,  the  number  of  firms  and  the  extent  of 
disequilibrium ( t t NOF NOF * − ) when we assume that the other variables in the model remain 
unchanged  (in  other  words  we  make  the  usual  ceteris  paribus  assumption),  and  only  the 
replacement and displacement effects, and the effect of variable  ) * ( 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF  influence the 
entry and exit levels, and the associated changes in the number of firms. For simplicity we also 
assume  that  the  full  cumulative  replacement  and  displacement  effects  of  an  exogenous  shock 
capitalize in one period of time. This is not far from reality, as was illustrated in Table 4. 
Several important observations can be drawn from these tables.
20 First, for undershooting 
                                                 
19 We use absolute numbers in this illustration as this is more insightful. It is also consistent with the coefficients reported in Table 5. 
In our econometric model, both the entry and exit rate are scaled on the number of firms. In addition, the log difference between 
the actual and equilibrium number of firms approximately equals the absolute difference divided by the number of firms. So, 
basically all variables that play a role in equilibrium restoration are scaled on the number of firms. Therefore we may use the 
absolute numbers. 
 
20 The tables should be read as follows. In Table 6, the starting situation is described in the first two rows (t=0 and t=1). At the end of 
period 0 the number of firms equals 90 while entry and exit in period 1 both equal 10. By definition the number of firms at the 
end  of  period  1  then  also  equals  90  (using
t t t t EXIT ENTRY NOF NOF − + = − 1 ).  In  period  2  entry  equals 
) * ( 048 . 0 95 . 0 1 2 1 − − − − × − × t t t NOF NOF Exit  = 0.95 x 10 -0.048 x -10 = 9.98 which is rounded to 10.0 (coefficients 
are taken from the left panel of Table 5). Analogously exit equals  ) * ( 039 . 0 93 . 0 1 2 1 − − − − × + × t t t NOF NOF Entry  = 
0.93 x 10 +0.039 x -10 = 8.91. At the end of period 2 this leads to an increase of the number of firms of 1.07 (=9.98-8.91), 
hence the number of firms at the end of period 2 is 91.1 (rounded to one decimal). In the column “Contribution to error-
correction”  the  net-entry  effect  is  divided  between  a  contribution  of  the  entry  and  exit  interrelation  mechanism  (i.e.  the 
interaction of replacement and displacement effects) and a contribution of the extent of competition between incumbent firms 
(i.e. the effect of the variable ) * 1 2 − − − t t NOF NOF . So, for instance, the entry/exit effect for period 2 equals 0.95 x 10 – 
0.93 x 10 = 0.2. On the other hand, the isolated effect of 
1 2 * − − − t t NOF NOF  equals -0.048 x -10 – 0.039 x -10 = 0.9, 
(0.87 when rounded to two decimals). Hence, in period 2 the contribution of the entry/exit mechanism to the net-change in the   28 
(Table 6) the process of convergence is slow and this is because the replacement and displacement 
interactions  (column  entry/exit)  actually  contribute  to  a  divergence  of  the  process  away  from 
equilibrium. This divergence effect is compensated by the incumbents mechanism (i.e. the effect of 
1 2 * − − − t t NOF NOF ),  which  does  contribute  to  the  restoration  of  equilibrium.  In  concreto,  this 
mechanism leads to a 15.8 increase in the number of firms over the period considered, which 
compensates for the negative contribution to error-correction of -5.8 of the entry/exit mechanism. 
Second,  for  overshooting  (Table  7)  the  process  converges  much  faster:  after  four  periods  the 
number of firms already ‘shoots’ through its equilibrium value. Here the process converges much 
faster because both mechanisms work in the same direction: they both contribute to a decline of the 
number of firms (see the two columns under the header “Cumulative contribution” which display 
only negative  values,  at least until  convergence  is  reached),  and  hence  positively to  the  error-
correction process, in this case. We also see that the contribution of the entry/exit mechanism is 
much stronger (-15.5) compared to that of the incumbent mechanism (-1.3). Third, combining the 
two observations above, we note that the equilibrium-restoring mechanisms are different for under 
and  overshooting.  Our  estimation  results  imply  that  for  undershooting,  a  lack  of  competition 
between incumbent firms contributes to restoration of equilibrium (creating room for new-firm 
entry) while in overshooting competition induced by new firms (in particular strong displacement) 
causes the number of firms to move towards equilibrium. Fourth, as an illustration, in Table 7 we 
also compute the effects when the process has already shot through its equilibrium, (erroneously) 
assuming that the coefficients estimated for overshooting also apply to situations of undershooting. 
We see that the number of firms keeps declining away from equilibrium. This illustrates that it is 
necessary to distinguish between undershooting and overshooting situations when modelling the 
interrelation between entry and exit, because otherwise the process modelled shoots through its 
equilibrium and never returns (see the NOF column in Table 7). This is not realistic. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
number of firms is 0.2, while the contribution of the incumbents mechanism is 0.9. Note that the sum of these contributions 
exactly equals the difference between entry and exit (i.e. 10.0-8.9=0.2+0.9=1.1). The final column contains the cumulative 
contributions of these two equilibrium restoring mechanisms. So, for instance for undershooting we see that after 91 periods the 
number of firms has increased with ten firms (i.e. from 90 to 100; the process has thus converged to equilibrium) and this 
increase can be split between the two mechanisms in -5.8 and 15.8. Note that the entry/exit mechanism actually causes the 
number of firms to move away from equilibrium. Results in Table 7 are computed in a similar fashion, this time using the 
coefficients of the right panel of Table 5. 
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Table 6: Equilibrium restoration in case of undershooting, simulation 





Time  NOF*  NOF  NOF-
NOF* 
 




0    90.0               
1  100  90.0  -10.0  10.0  10.0         
2  100  91.1  -8.9  10.0  8.9  0.2  0.9  0.2  0.9 
3  100  91.1  -8.9  8.9  8.9  -0.8  0.9  -0.6  1.7 
4  100  92.0  -8.0  8.9  8.0  0.1  0.8  -0.5  2.5 
5  100  92.1  -7.9  8.0  7.9  -0.7  0.8  -1.2  3.3 
6  100  92.9  -7.1  7.9  7.1  0.1  0.7  -1.1  4.0 
7  100  93.0  -7.0  7.1  7.0  -0.6  0.7  -1.7  4.7 
8  100  93.7  -6.3  7.0  6.4  0.0  0.6  -1.6  5.3 
9  100  93.8  -6.2  6.4  6.3  -0.5  0.6  -2.1  5.9 
10  100  94.3  -5.7  6.3  5.7  0.0  0.6  -2.1  6.4 
                   
30  100  98.2  -1.8  2.0  1.8  0.0  0.2  -4.7  12.9 
31  100  98.3  -1.7  1.8  1.8  -0.1  0.2  -4.8  13.1 
32  100  98.4  -1.6  1.7  1.6  0.0  0.2  -4.8  13.2 
                   
90  100  99.9  -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  -5.8  15.7 
91  100  100.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  -5.8  15.8 
Note: All variables in the table refer to absolute numbers. In the column “Contribution to error-correction” entry/exit 
refers to the replacement and displacement interactions while the column incumbents refers to the effect of the extent of 
disequilibrium in the number of (incumbent) firms. The bold-printed numbers in the last two columns at period 91 
indicate the cumulative contribution of the two error-correction mechanisms at the time of convergence. 
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Table 7: Equilibrium restoration in case of overshooting, simulation 





Time  NOF*  NOF  NOF-
NOF* 




0    110.0               
1  100  110.0  10.0  10.0  10.0         
2  100  101.3  1.3  6.4  15.2  -8.1  -0.6  -8.1  -0.6 
3  100  101.3  1.3  9.9  9.9  0.6  -0.6  -7.5  -1.3 
4  100  93.2  -6.8  6.6  14.7  -8.0  -0.1  -15.5  -1.3 
5  100  93.2  -6.8  9.8  9.8  0.1  -0.1  -15.4  -1.4 
6  100  85.7  -14.3  6.8  14.3  -7.9  0.4  -23.3  -1.0 
7  100  85.7  -14.3  9.7  9.7  -0.4  0.4  -23.8  -0.6 
8  100  78.7  -21.3  6.9  13.9  -7.9  0.9  -31.7  0.3 
9  100  78.7  -21.3  9.7  9.7  -0.9  0.9  -32.6  1.3 
10  100  72.2  -27.8  7.1  13.6  -7.8  1.4  -40.4  2.6 
Note: All variables in the table refer to absolute numbers. In the column “Contribution to error-correction” entry/exit 
refers to the replacement and displacement interactions while the column incumbents refers to the effect of the extent of 
disequilibrium in the number of (incumbent) firms. The bold-printed numbers in the last two columns at period 4 
indicate the cumulative contribution of the two error-correction mechanisms at the time the number of firms ‘shoots’ 
through its equilibrium value. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
Despite the fact that the main contribution of entrepreneurship theory to economics has been to 
provide an account of the performance of markets in disequilibrium, little empirical research on 
entrepreneurship has examined firm entry and exit in this context. In this paper, we attempt to 
redress this by modelling the interrelationship between firm entry and exit rates in disequilibrium. 
Using a data base of Dutch retail industries over the period 1980-2001, we are able to distinguish 
between  displacement  (entry  causing  exit)  and  replacement  (exit  causing  entry)  effects.  We 
introduce a new  methodological approach which allows us to investigate whether the relations 
under consideration differ between situations of ‘undershooting’ (the actual number of firms is 
below  the  equilibrium  number)  and  ‘overshooting’  (vice  versa).  We  find  that  the  equilibrium-
restoring mechanisms are different in these two situations – being faster in over than undershoots. 
Our estimation results also imply that for undershooting, a lack of competition between incumbent 
firms  contributes  to  restoration  of  equilibrium  (creating  room  for  new-firm  entry)  while  in 
overshooting  competition  induced  by  new  firms  (in  particular  strong  displacement)  causes  the 
number of firms to move towards equilibrium.    31 
The research helps to embed entrepreneurship theory into mainstream economics in a manner 
that adds greater insight into the performance of markets in disequilibrium.  The mechanisms of 
replacement and displacement (particularly displacement) are consistent with Schumpeter’s (1934) 
depiction of creative destruction where marginal, inefficient firms are displaced by new (sometimes 
innovative) firms. Therefore, the results seem to imply that creative destruction plays a bigger role 
when the number of firms in the market is relatively high. In this case (i.e. overshooting) it may be 
expected that there are more ‘marginal’ entrepreneurs than in case of undershooting, hence the 
displacement effect is stronger. However, we also note that in undershooting, the displacement 
effect is also relatively strong (compared to replacement). This means that, even when the number 
of firms in a market is relatively low, incumbent firms are also threatened by these new firms. But 
it is clear that displacement is much stronger for overshooting. These results appear to indicate that 
variety and selection in a Schumpeterian sense, where industries are rejuvenated by high levels of 
replacement and displacement - assuming that firms are being displaced by new firms that are more 
efficient - primarily takes place in industries where the number of firms is above the long-run 
sustainable number of firms.  
We also find that the the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is slower for undershooting 
than for overshooting. Likewise, we find another asymmetry between over and undershoots in that 
in each of these forms of disequilibrium entry and exit react differently to an excessive or deficient 
stock  of  incumbent  firms  compared  to  the entry  of new  firms  or the  exit  of incumbent  firms. 
Disequilibrium  in  the  number  of  incumbents  drives  the  entry/exit  equilibrating  process  in 
undershoots whereas replacement and particularly displacement effects dominate in overshoots. In 
line with orthodoxy, we interpret the relatively low number of firms in a market characterised by 
undershooting as an indication of a lack of competition between incumbent firms, where a higher 
gap indicates a lower level of competition. The low level of competition makes it easier to enter the 
market, and, once entered, to survive in the market. This causes the number of firms to move up 
towards  equilibrium.  In  overshooting  competition  induced  by  new  firms  (in  particular  strong 
displacement) causes the number of firms to move down towards equilibrium. 
From a policy perspective the results indicate that the importance to have an ongoing supply 
of new firms is likely to be a more pressing issue in an under than in an overshoot (i.e. slow 
adjustment back  to  equilibrium when  markets  are  below  equilibrium).  This raises  the  question 
whether policy initiatives aimed at increasing the supply of entrepreneurs should vary in intensity   32 
in an undershoot compared to an overshoot. Furthermore, it is unclear in an overshoot whether the 
strong displacement effect is just a faster ‘revolving door’ effect where the throughput of entrants 
to exit just becomes faster (i.e. the failure rate among new ventures accelerates) or whether this 
form of Schumpeterian creative destruction displaces weak incumbents.  In sum, we believe the 
analysis has made a small but important step towards more closely embedding entrepreneurship 
theory within mainstream economics in a manner that adds greater insight into the performance of 
markets in disequilibrium. In the process, we believe it raises some important considerations for 
policy as well as insights for managers and entrepreneurs. 
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